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William James as Moral anri Social Philosopher 
by 
Henry 0. Aiken 
\\"illiam James is less well known for his work as a moral. social. and political 
philosopher than his younger friend and disciple. John Dewey. In these areas. un­
like Dewey. he offers us sketches rather than treatises. concatenated essays rather 
than books. By stages. howe\'er. I have found that he not only anticipates Dewt>y 
in certain ways, bul that in the end his insights are deeper. and his sen ti men ts surer. 
However, this is not said in depreciation of Dewey. 
Better to set James in contrast to his friends Pe-irce and Royce. with rt'spN.'l 
to whom he was, in most ways, their dialectical opposite. They were communalists. 
he was an individualist: they were utopians, he an anti-utopian realist: they hunger­
ed for something they both called "the great community:" his own uni\'ersalism 
and humanitarianism was always fused with an eradicable love of the individual. In 
this respect, James reminds one of Justice Brandeis in his dislike of bigness. He 
loved small things, human and otherwise, and cared more, perhaps. for the part 
than the whole. Throughout this part of his work, James continues to exemplify 
his tough-mindedness as well as his tender-heartedness, his pessimism as well as his 
very qualified optimism. He was, as he put it, a "meliorist," a progressi\'e, and, 
above all1 a liberal. Although he was not without interest in certain forms of social· 
ism, James could never be a socialist. And he seems to ha\'e beE'n completely un· 
affected by Marx and Marxism. In this part of his thought, he remained a dualist, 
and his mind always worked, in its own free-wheeling way, dialectically. Most 
important of all, James was always a finitist, interested in practicable reforms, and 
in the gradual amelioration of the lot of his fellow human beings. 
I I  
Let me begin by saying something about James' views in the sphere of theo· 
retical, or philosophical, ethics. Here we have mainly to rely on one notable essay, 
"The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life." In it, he makes no sharp distinction 
between moral theory and moral practice, and his ethical theory is plainly a by­
product of his practical moral and social sentiments. 
To begin with, one is struck by the fact that, unlike his younger friend and 
colleague, Ralph Barton Perry, he insisted that moral principles are to be distin· 
guished from those of science. Here also he is to be distinguished from Dewey. In 
fact, he remains closer to John Stuart Mill, as that great moral philosopher con· 
ceives of ethics (as distinct from science} in the last chapter or his Logic. Moreover, 
his point of view is, in certain ways, close to those of Hume. In the somewhat mis· 
leading, though by now conventional lingo or G.E. Moore, James is an "anti-natur­
ist." The significant point, as Moore contended, is that it is always a mistake to in· 
fer, directly, moral conclusions from factual premises. Science, which is concerned 
with the explanation and prediction or matters of fact, provides the data on which 
practical decisions and choices are made; but it cannot logically lead us directly to 
those decisions. We must decide for ourselves what we ought to do. This implies 
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that we have live options and, within limits, an area of freedom. In lhe language of 
Jean-Paul Sartre (James himself is often described as an American existentialist ). 
that is to say, man may be said to be born or, more dramaticaJly, ''condemned" to 
be free. In a Laplac::ean universe, the moral life has no meaning. 
Given his admiration for Mill, one might guess lhat James was a utrnitarian; 
according to which aJI significant, or worthwhile obligations are intended to produce 
some good. This, however, does not mean that James defined, or would have de· 
fined, the "ought" in terms or the "good." Human beings may have obligations, or 
be bound by moral or quasi-moral imperatives, which are not aimed at some good 
(rightly or wrongly ). In (act, James made no sharp distinctions between an impera· 
live and an impulse. Impulses, and hence imperatives are directed to the production 
of a good, only graduaJly, in consequence or experience, and upon reflection. Thus, 
any indjvidual may reel bound by an imperative merely by habit. In short, the early 
moraJ lire of human beings is largely a matter or what sociologists call "accultura· 
tion." 
How does James .conceive of good and the good life? He tells us, as regards 
good itselr, that something is good if, and only if, it serves to satisfy some desire. 
Here, it may be worthwhile to compare and contrast his posi tion with that o f  Perry. 
Now, according to Perry, in his doctrine, as developed in his impressive General. 
Theory of VaJue, something is good in so far as it is the object of someone's inter­
est. It need not, accordingly, provide satisfaction. James' view is different. As he 
puts it, the object of a desire is worthless unless it affords some actual satisfaction. 
The question remains whether James is a hedonist: does he equate satisfaction of 
desire with pleasure. This is a long and comp!Ccated problem, but as I read him, the 
satisfaction of desire need not result in certain supposed sensations of pleasure, if 
such there be. He means what he says: something is desirable if, on achieving it, we 
are, as we say "satisfied." "Das ist genug," as the Germans would say. 
More important is James' immediate remark that there often, if not always, 
occurs, a conflict or desir� or as he puts it, "wills." James' position regarding con­
flict is ot great interest. He hopes, to be sure, that conflicts of will may be over­
come. Like Hegel, he also regards conflict as a source of the zest, passion, and pow­
er of our lives. Out or conmct we develop will power, strength of character, the 
ability to pursue some way of life suitable to ourselves and, one may hope, other 
people. In this regard, James is a promethean. But there remains the other side. 
Conflict is not ultimately valuable for its own sake. Conflict ought to be overcome 
from his (moral) point of view. Thus he tells us: "Sacrifice all wills not organized 
or that go against the whole." 
Herein lies one or the centraJ tensions in James' moral philosophy. Tension, 
conflict, opposition are the breeders of progress, and he, like Mill, regards man as, 
par excellence, the progressive animal. Self-improvement, like social improvement, 
depends upon connict, as well as its overcoming. All the same, he remains a holist: 
that is to say, conflict should result, by stages, in individual and/or social harmony. 
It is not a good in itself. This will have to serve as an introduction to James• ethicaJ 
theory. 
Ill 
Let us now tum to the practical moral philosophy which is inseparably relat­
ed to James' ethical theory, and which provides its ground. As Perry remarks, again 
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and again, James was the exemplum of an individualist, and. indeed. his individltal· 
ism, conceived as an ideology, goes deep. He was always sympathetic, and pied for 
sympathy to the needs and desires of particular indhriduals and social groups. This 
attitude perhaps is most poignantly shown in his essay "On a Certain Blindness in 
Human Beings." Let me quote one or two choice passages, by way of illustration. 
Jn the seeond paragraph he begins by saying "Now the blindness in human beings. 
of which this discourse will treat, is the blindness with which we all are afOicted 
in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from ourselves" (629). 
The points that James is making are two: (a) Few have any difficulty sympathizing 
with people like themselves; men, say, with men, women with women, older people 
with other older people, aoolescents with their peers., blacks with blacks, whites with 
whites, and so on. It is far more difficult for a man to sympathize with a woman 
going through menopause, an experience which he knows about not by acquaint· 
ance but only by description; it is hard for an old fogey like myself to feel, not to 
mention show, sympathy for the unspeakable longings of my young son and daugh· 
ter. Even the most well-drilled advocate of equal rights, if he is a white, has diffi· 
culty in feeling intimately the sense of humniation which many blacks still feel in 
the presence of whites; and as I have found, it is hard for some stern feminists to 
understand or feel for men who love women and want, with not much ado, to take 
them to bed. There are, of course, many exceptions, but they merely reinforce the 
rule. (b) The other point is no less interesting. Here let me quote again from James: 
"Take our dogs and ourselves, connected as we are by a tie more intimate than most 
ties in this world; and yet, outside of that tie of friendly fondness, how insensible, 
each of us, to all that makes life significant for the other!!  ... " (630) The dog we 
conceive as a "creature," not as a person. Does he possess rights? We may come to 
think so, as I do. Yet in practice, and James, throughout this essay is concerned 
only with our lives as "practical beings" who have limited functions and duties to 
perform, we may overlook such rights. 
11le point may be carried further. Sympathy is possible only whiere, as we say, 
there is empathy, a prior sense, that is of likeness. To sympathize with my dog I 
must, in a way, be capable· of feeling like a dog - and who can do that, save, so to 
say, when he is hung over. I myself happen to abhore, am even afraid, of moths. I 
sw.at, or flail at them, instinctively. Damn them and damn their creator. What harm 
have they ever done me? None that I know of. Here is a case, even if a somewhat 
ridiculous one, of the blindness regarding creatures, of which James is speaking. 
Many other examples of such blindness abound in the essay. One is especially fine. 
Like Rousseau or, better, Thoreau, I find myself sick unto death of town or city 
life, and so go out into the country in order to redeem my heritag·e of our fore· 
fathers who lived., simply and naturally, on the land. Then we pass a mountaineer 
who is clearing the land in order to bring it under cultivation, and so pass out of a 
staite of nature. Here says James, "l instantly feel (his word is "felt'") that I (have) 
been losing the whole inward significance of the situation. Because to me the clear· 
ings spoke of naught but denudation" (631). 
Now James generalizes: "Wherever," he says, "a process of life communicates 
111 eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant" (631). 
Th.ere is the capital point, which he makes throughout the essay. The message is 
clear: Not only is the individual life of any person meaningful to him, it is our task 
to make it significant to ourselves, however different we may be from him (or her). 
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This is the great boon and blessing of those sympathetic ones, of whom James him­
self is such an effecting and exemplary instance. 
O! what importance is aJI this so far as ethics is concerned? The answer is 
plain. Morally speaking, James is making a plea Cor pluralism , and hence of respect 
for the moral attitudes ot people unlike ourselves. This does not mean that we must 
follow them in refusing to eat meat on Frida.y, in getting ourselves circumcized, or 
in developing sexual practices which seem to us, not merely strange, but unnecess­
arily restrictive. We too are individuals and must also be, as Emerson, a favorite of 
James, true to ourselves. Moral faddism, like ethical attitudinizing, is nauseating. 
"Trust thyself," said the Concord sage, "eveey heart vibrates to that iron string." 
Would that this were true! We may also be blind to the virtues of our own life 
styles and tastes. Said Tristam Shandy : let anyone ride his hobbyhorse down the 
king's highway at his own gait - so long as he does not command mP. to get up and 
ride behind him. James, as I recall, does not develop this side of the great point 
he has in view, but it is implicit everywhere in his writings on the topic. 
James' ethical pluralism-not to be <Dlfused with the various facile ethical rela­
tivisms that abound in our time - is aJl of a piece with this metaphysical pluralism, 
as expounded in his A P1uralistic Universe. James was, temperamentally, a pluralist. 
But he was aJso a pluralist by renection and settled conviction. There is more, how­
ever, to the story, as we shall soon see. For James, although a rugged individualist, 
was by no means a ragged one. 
At this point, let me suggest what may lie at the root of James' passion for 
democracy. James had little use for simple minded majoritarianism. As again we 
shall see, he also believed in sociaJ classes and in not abandoning one's own station 
in society and life, and the duties that go w�th them. In his view, what lies at the 
core of any acceptable democratic society is "the democratic respect for the sacred­
ness of Individuality" (Perry 266). Here, following Perry, it is useful to compare 
James' moral point of view with those of his friends and friendly antagonists, Peirce 
and Royce. Peirce and Royce were enraptured by the idea, or ideal, of a great, ex­
panding community, which, they believed, would come about in the fullness of 
time. James, the realist, regarded this aspiration or purpose, as pure hogwash. He 
did not oppose community - far from it. But any community, or communalism, 
with which he could identify himself would first have to respect the individual, with 
all his eccentricities and differences. 
Here begins, in full earnest, the dialectic of which I have already spoken. 
Royce, too, as a foUower of Hegel, was a dialectician. But the dialectic of history 
which he, like his master, was an advocate, was, in the end, inevitablistic, leaving 
little room for individual freedom and choice. James also knew that scientific laws 
are real, that history, too, has its own necessities, which limit the options of individ­
uals and social groups. He also accepted these as facts. But he not only believed in 
free action, he also believed that by resolute determination, individuals and groups 
alike can modify their environments and their lives according to their hearts' desire 
- always, o! course, within realistic limits. Wherein lies the truth? The answer lies 
In the dialectic itself. The world, and man as a central being in the world, is malle­
able, subject to mutation, including mutations brought about by the determined 
decisions and actions of ordinary human beings. On the one side is the inescapable 
reality of man's institutional life; on the other is the no less inescapable fact of the 
individual's inability, or refusal, to be an institutional man. Of course, man's insti-
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tutional life 1s based upon his Jikeness to others. But no institution can wholly 
dominate its members. They have their O\•m indi\'idual rows to hoe. and they v.ill 
hoe them willy-nilly. Of course James li\'ed before the era of totalitarianism. but 
by extrapolation, I am sure he would han• said that, whereas totalitarianism may 
exist as an ideology. a fully totalistic society will ne\'er occur - so long as there rt'· 
mains one lonely soul who refuses to comply, who breaks tht> rules, or who, how­
ever secretly, smokes pot, eats parsnips, goes swimming in the nude, or pisses on 
the sidewaJk. Says the totalist .. Keep off the grass." Says the indiridualist, .. Just 
for that, 111 walk over the grass." Says the tolalist, "You belong to the st�te. and 
must follow its dictates." Says the Jamesian, "Just because you command me to do 
so, 111 break your blood laws and rules, and get away with murder, if I can do so." 
I beg the reader not to be put off by my examples. James was not preaching. 
nor am I, a kind of systematic rebelliousness or wanton disregard for institutions. 
including the state. So far as I know, he was, as a rule, a law abiding citizen, paid 
his debts, and did his duty, not merely because it was required of him, but because 
his moral sense committed him to do so. But he held that no institution and no soc­
iety can fully determine the inward feelings, and values, of individuals. Our night 
thoughts are our own, and they are precious both to ourselves and occassionally to 
others, especially when we do not forget them in the heat of the day. 
Ultimately, James was at the same time a qualified indi\'idualist and qualified 
communaJist, and there, for the time being, we must let the matter rest. "Damn 
the absolute," he once said to Royce. "Nothing is absolutely true, nothing is abso­
lutely good or evil. The universe, including the ethical universe, is not completely 
full." 
In bringing this section to a close, let me say something about James' defense 
of tolerance, which is merely a corollary of the gospel already outlined. For many 
moral and social philosophers, toleration has primarily an instrumental value. Nor 
would James deny, as a pragmatist, the utility of tolerance. But I think he would al­
so have said that tolerance is intri nsically valuable as well, that it is good, or right, 
per se to be tolerant, to respect the idiosyncrasies, including the idiosyncratic con· 
victions, of those with whom we do not agree. Put it in another way: I am com­
manded by the Christian gospel to love my neighbor. But I cannot love my neigh. 
bor, if I do not also love his freedom to go his own way, so long as he does not in­
terfere unnecessarily with my freedom and my individuality. We may all be created 
in the image of God. But there are many such images, each of which has its own 
inviolable right to be and to propagate. John Locke, an early defender of the gos­
pel of toleration, set rather strict, and to us, curious, limits to what a well-ordered 
society may properly tolerate. According to him, toleration should not be extended 
to atheists, Catholics, and Moslems, though for different reasons, which we need 
not go into here. ln James' view, if I may speak for him, such limits are, in princi­
ple outrageous. Doctrinal atheism is largely harmless. What matters is a sense of the 
holy. There are few atheists who do not have a sense of the holy, however much 
they may try to disguise the Cact. Betrand Russell, whom James admired and who 
admired James, was formally an atheist. But few men have been so imbued, and 
fruitfully imbued, with a sense of the holiness of human life, of human love, of 
peace, and of the contemplation of beautiful ideas and works of art. On this scori!, 
certainly, Russell was James' man. James, who believed, or tried to believe, in a 
finite god, could not conceivably have been a Catholic, and I imagine that Catholic-
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ism in most respects was, for him, a repugnant institutionall r@ligion. Yet I cannot 
imagine that James would refuse to tolerate Catholics - so long as they acknow­
ledged bis right not to become one. As for Mostems, whom Locke said could not be 
tolerated because of their strange customs and folk-ways, I have no doubt that 
James would have been charmed by them, and would have defended their right to 
exist in lthe Unjted Stat.es, and to practice their rituals and rites without molesta­
tion. 
IV 
Let us now say something about James' relations with Santayana, whom I 
have elsewhere suggested was, despite his disguises and affectations, a philosophical 
pragmatist, for they are pertinent to a fuller view of James• moral philosophy and 
practice. Santayana shared James' sense of the diversity of moral attitudes and 
practices, and so long as they did not interfere with his own curious latinate aristo­
cratic mode of life, and his desire to live in hotels in Rome, far from the madding 
crowd, whose company he did not enjoy, he was tolerant of them and preached a 
detached and amused tolerance which, despite their differences, was not wholly 
foreign to that of James himself, who, for all his love of democracy, was, as we 
shall see, a committed member of the educated class, and who probably would not 
have delighted in the company or most American Indians in his own day. After all, 
James was a Brahmin, to the manor born. He was not fastidious, as Perry tells us, 
about most things. But he did not delight in boors, in the uncouth, in drunkenness, 
or, to bring the point ieloser to Santayana's door step, homosexuality. I think he 
would have regarded Wittgenstein as a brilliant freak and would have avoided him, 
save at meetings or the Aristotelian Society. But these differences of taste were not 
what deeply divided James from Santayana. What did divide them, is the tact that 
Santayana always remained a fastidious spectator, never an activist. He could sym­
pathize with outlandish peoples and be charmed by their curious customs, but only 
in Imagination. He was neither by temperament nor conviction, a participator. He 
always sat in the grandstands and would have fainted if invited to play ball himself. 
James, on the contrary, was always an actor and an activist. He wanted to change 
the world, to improve it, not merely by his writings but by his participation in the 
social and civic life of the community. In short, James was a reformer who always 
associated himsel! actively with other reformers. Santayana, to be sure, was well 
aware that the moral life requires us to make decisions, and he made many decisions. 
But he wanted others to stay off his grass, and wanted his privacy respected. He was 
usually very charming when young Americans, including young American philo­
sophers, called on him in Rome. According to his lights, he was also generous both 
of his time and his money. But an active moral and social being he was not. On this 
score, James may be better compared with other public men among the philoso­
phical gentry, including Rus.5ell, Mill, and my own favorite philosopher, David 
Hume, who, In his charming autobiography, said that he would be content to be 
remembered simply as a member of "the party of humanity." That, by and large, 
was James' view, and, like Hume, belonging to the party of humanity, required 
something more than writing about it. 
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v 
We ha\'e now come to terms with another central aspect of James' thought 
and conduct as a practical moralist. which many or his admirers as well as his critics 
have found harder to take. This concerns his doctrine of the importance or struggle. 
risk. as well as a kind of romantic courage, not to mention his advocacy, a la Teddy 
Roosevelt, of a certain martial \iew of life. Here we find his ''iew·s best stated in the 
sequel to "What �fakes Life Significant," a remarkable essay entitled "On a Certain 
Blindness in Human Beings," and in a later paper "The Moral Equivalent of War." 
Here again, he begins by preaching the gospel of tolerance. But shortly the theme 
changes. The following passage, which I quote kl extenso conveys his attitude far 
better than I can do by paraphrase: 
.. .I soon recognized that it was the element that gi\•es to the wicked 
outer world aJl its moral style, expressiveness and picturesqueness, -
the element of precipitousness, so to call it, of strength and stren­
uousness, intensity and danger. What excites and interests the looker· 
on at life (pace Santayana}, what the romances and the statues cele­
brate and the grim civic monuments remind us of, is the everlasting 
battle of the powers of light with those of darkness: with heroism, 
reduced to bare chance, yet ever and anon snatching victory from 
the jaws of death. (648). 
Again speaking of the other side of this doctrine of struggle and heroism. he cries, 
"The price must be paid!" And he fully knew what the price might be: death itself. 
Undoubtedly, this doctrine, along with the manner of its expression, has its 
morbid side, and we must never forget, in discussing James' ethics, his own fits of 
morbidity, his proneness to the James' family's malady - the dark nights of the 
soul. One is reminded here of the fact that Henry James, Sr. lost an arm by shoving 
his hand into a fire - evidently merely to prove a point. So our admiration for 
James' cult of struggle and risk, and of the necessity for hard sacrifices, must remain 
quallified. On the other side, precisely the same attitude gave immense strength to 
members of the Resistance during World War I I  and to many others who have had 
to cast their lot, however forlornly, against oppression and tyranny in their own 
lives and societies. With qualifications, then 1 myself am, were I not suieh a coward, 
James' man. As the old saw has. it, nothing ventured nothing gained. And some· 
times, as Socrates made clear when he drank the hemlock, it is better to die than to 
submit to tyranny. It is always tyranny, in all its devilish forms, against which 
James protests and demands that we protest, not with our words only but by sacri­
fices that could bring us great bodily harm, mental anguish, as well as the loss of 
our friends and allies. The same spirit animated Sartre and, in part, led to his break 
with Camus. 
Let us conclude this discussion on a rather more amiable note. Later In the 
essay "What Makes a Life Significant," James enters into an extended discussion of 
Tolstoy, whom he greatly admired. He tells us that readers of that great novelist 
will share a feeling similar to that of Tolstoy, "with Its abhorrence of all that con­
ventionally passes for distinguished, and its exclusive viJification of the deification 
of the bravery, patience, kindliness, and dumbness of the unconscious natural man." 
Tolstoy, as James remarks, had his own crisis of melancholy. But what came of it, 
in his case, was a commitment to democracy, by which Tolstoy meant a "leveling 
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philosophy," a love or the common people, their folk art, and their moral attitudes. 
Now we tum to the more controversial and famous essay "The Moral Equh·a· 
lent of War." � Perry tells us, natty and without qualification, James was a paci­
r11t, a man of peace, who hated war, especially or an imperialmstic kind. How could 
such a man advocate "the martial spirit," admire many of the so-called military 
virtues, and make a virtual fetish of the moraJ equivalent of war'? The answer is at 
once difficult and important. Says Perry, ''The martial spirit was implied in James' 
moral dualism. Good is good and evil is evil, and it is the part of righteousness to 
love the one and to hate the other with equal whole-heartedness." Just so. He 
wanted to develop the moral virtues of the military man, without his own charac· 
teristic laults and blindnesses: that is to say, we must be courageous, be ready to 
sacrifice our lives in the good fight or battle, be resolute, keep the faith. James 
never included among tlhese virtues the following or orders. Perhaps he was himself 
blind to the fact that the good soldier follows the orders or Ms superiors and that a 
military society is the paradigm of a regimented society. We must not, however, 
forget that James sublimates the martial virtues, and does not, so far as I can see, 
praise soldiers simpliciter. Just the contrary. 
James' celebration or the moral equivalents or the virtues commonly ascribed 
to the good soldier was, as Perry reminds us, closely related to his tendency to 
neurasthenia. He was prone to illness, something of an hypochondriac, who would 
then be driven to a revulsion of feeling which would require him to get up from his 
sick bed, actual or psychological, and do something. James' celebration of the mar· 
tiaJ spirit remained the other side of his own deep personal need for achievement; he 
could never rest on his laurels, many though they were. Each day is a new day, and 
we must confront it, despite all our desire to sit back and take a well-earned rest, 
bravely and heroically. 
At this point, let me say a word about J.ames' important views of habilt. Now 
habits, in themselves, are neither good nor bad. It is their effects, or consequences 
that make them so. All or us are creatures of habit, like it or not. The important 
thing is that bad habits may be broken and good ones cultivated. For our purposes, 
what matters is James' contention that if we resolutely try to break a bad habit 
and cultivate a good one, and continue to do so for only a week, we are likely to 
nnd that the new habit stays with us and the old one remains no more than a bad 
memory. The point is, that the strenuous, or heroic, life may become habitual, so 
that we do not have to gird our loins each time we find ourselves in danger in order 
to make an heroic leap. James' ethics continually reflect his psychology, just as his 
psychology, in many ways, is a product of his moral insights. 
I will conclude this section simply by remarking upon James' interest as a 
psychologist on what happens to. human beings when placed in stress, and hi& moral 
advocacy of living as well as one can and even at some danger to one's health and 
peace of mind under a sense of pressure. A minor example will serve to illustrate 
the point. I myself learned through James from Perry that if one would make a 
practice (habit) of getting along with four or five hours of good sleep a night, one 
could get monumental amounts of work done that are denied the stay..abeds. James' 
contention, in fact, is that most people sleep a good part of their lives away, when 
it would be perfectly possible for them, were they willing to do so, to be awake 
and alive for 19 or 20 hours a day, doing good work of one sort or another. 
What James is talking about here is developed saliently in various papers in-
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eluding especially "The Energies of Men." There are, he contended, vast reservoirs 
ol energy ol which most indi\'iduals are unaware and never manage to tap - whether 
it is a matter of getting along on less sleep, or fighting against momentary fatigue, 
writing another sentence when one thinks the last one is the last one can write for 
a week. Whether it is a matter of eating less and getting more strength from what 
one does eat, whatever - it is all the same. Like Thoreau, in short, James wanted to 
drive life into a comer, even if. in so doing, he (or she) might fall apart in the proc� 
ess. 
Was James reckless? It is hard to say. He certainly did dri\'e himself almost to 
death on many occasions, and he paid a high price by so doing. But how much he 
accomplished as teacher, writer, friend, and man of the world! How much do we 
owe him, not only for his achievements, but also for his example. Here again, for 
the sake of comparison, J.S. Mill comes to mind. Like James, Mill was subjt>ct to 
periodic nervous break-downs; he, too, knew the bitter taste of melancholy, weari· 
ness, failure. But how much the world owes him, just as it owes so much to James. 
There are not many of us who can follow in James' very large footsteps, and I am 
not suggesting that we should try. There are the immense dangers, psychologically, 
that must be paid by the over·achiever, in morals as in anything else. Still, on bal· 
ance, I am convinced that this side of James' moral philosophy is profoundly 
healthy-minded and sane. 
VI 
Every side of James' thought has a side contrary to it. And despite his stren· 
uous advocacy of the strenuous life, he also preached, with great insight, the "gos· 
pel" of relaxation. (I  find it amusing, as well as touching, that James' doctrines and 
theories are so often called "gospels" by him.) His point is both psychological and 
moral, and it is particularly well put in the concluding paragraph: 
The need of feeling responsible all the livelong day has been preach· 
ed long enough in our New England .... The way to do it (to be relax­
ed as well as responsible) paradoxical as it may seem, is genuinely 
not to care whether we ue doing it or not. Then, possibly, by the 
grace of God, you may all at once find that yo,u .!!! doing it, and, 
having teamed what the trick feels like, you may (again by the grace 
of God) be enabled to go o·n. (p. 258, essays) 
Early in the essay he tells us that the path to cheerfulness, if we are not cheer· 
ful, is simply to sit up heerfully and to look and act as if cheerfulness were there 
already. Assume a virtue if you have it not as the Bard said, and it is James' point 
here. So it is with kindliness, amiability, and other sentiments that form the parts 
of what we call good nature. Even if the day ever dawns in which it will not be nee� 
ed to fight the old heavy battles against Nature, it will still always be needed to fur· 
nish the background of sanity, serenity, and cheerfulness to life, to give moral elas· 
ticity to our disposition, to round off the wirey edge of our fretfulness, and make 
us good-humored and easy of approach" (243). Weakness is too much a part of life 
to be what doctors call "irritable weakness." The way to overcome weakness of the 
sort James had in mind is to practice the gospel of relaxation, to take It easy, as we 
say nowadays. Then we can return to the serious business of lite, reassume our 
martial efforts to do the right thing with that overplus of energy which all of us 
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need to win the battle or liCe. But moralil}' and psychology go together, and lbe 
gospel or rela.J<aiion � an integral part or what he calls "mental hygiene." 
VII  
It  is time to tum to the social and political aspects or James' ethics. Here, 
again, we find his dualism and diaJectical pitting or opposites at work. On the one 
side, once more, there has to be that militant self-assertiveness of which we have 
aJready spoken. On the other, there is the .. sentiment" or humanity. For James, the 
latter sentiment (and It is of great interest that he calls it a 11sentiment,'" just as he 
speaks of the sentiment of rationality, reminding us at the same time of Hume) 
comes about from a hatred of cruelty, a care for the underdog, and the disreput­
able. A.e, Perry tells us, James was often criticized for a certain indiscriminateness in 
his choice of friends, and there is a touching story about his amiablE: picking up of 
an astonished undergraduate whom he took home, gave a cup of tea and chewed 
the rag with for an hour or two. How many of his colleagues would have done that? 
Perry, for one, certainty, who picked me up,. more or less in the same way. 
James, as I have remarked early on, was never a utopian. He was a prngressive 
and a liberal, hoping only, by slow and often painful stages., to ameliorate the lot of 
his fellow human beings. He was, in his own time, a mug-wump, an anti-imperiaJist, 
and internationalist, and, most remarkable, a pacifist. 
But, like charity, the sentiment of humanity begins at home, and one must 
start by being kind to the members of one's family, one's friends, and, when poss­
ible, one's enemies. Internationalism is all very well, but all too many inrternation· 
alists are indifferent to the miseries they find on their own door steps. Once more, 
In politics, as in morals, James reminds us in effect of the curse of bigness, and it 
was the bigness of the United States of America that bothered him most. Perhaps 
the most mature statement ot. his own conception of his political rote is to be found 
in an address entitled "The Social VaJue of the College Bred." For all his advo­
cacy of democracy, James never aspired to a classless society. Like Mill, among 
others, he accepted class distinctions as an inevitable and, indeed, bendicial part 
of social life. It is the business of the educated classes, and especiaJly the college 
bred, to guard the "tone" of society. Like Mill and Matthew Arnold in the genera­
tion before him, he preached a doctrine of what Arnold called " the saving remnant" 
Mankind, nations, cities, towns, and families alike must have, and should have, their 
leaders,, the choice spirits who may hope to uplift their fellows, by their example, 
by their works, and by their writings. "We ought to have our own class conscious­
ness," said James, and this holds true not only of the educated classes but also of 
those under-dogs who form what Marx, somewhat indiscriminately, called the pro­
letariat. 
Let me conclude by saying something about James' activities as a reformer. 
During the 1890's James was much concerned with the educational problems of the 
members of the Harvard faculty. Here, he was, as we might expect, a libertarian and 
individualist. And his scientific training disposed him to favor the liberalization of 
the curriculum at the expense of the ancient languages, for example. He also was 
well aware that there remains an 
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forward indefinitely mto its subtleties and specialues ... The other 
class of men may be mtelhgent but they are nol theoreucal .... These 
excellent fellov.'S need contact of some sort with the fighting side of 
life, wilh lhe world in which men and women earn their bread and 
butter and th·e and die ... 
By stages. howe,·er. James' acti\ities extended far beyond Hanard Yard. He 
used his influence, as Perry tells us. against bills before the state legi laturP designed 
to require the examination of medical practitioners - and. as 1 should add. we 
should never forget that James was himself a medical man before he was a psychol· 
ogist, and a philosopher. 
President Gro,·er Cleveland's Venezuela message, dispatched in December. 
1895, resulted in a crisis which impressed James, apparently for the first time with 
the danger that lurked in "the fighting instinct." Later he replied, against Teddy 
Roose,•elt 's bully-boy conduct of our foreign affairs, by saying "We are evidently 
guilty of Iese-majest.e ... " He was leery of the misapplications of the Monroe doc· 
trine, which all too often, then as now, has been employed in the series of our own 
imperialistic ends. 
As Perry says, James saw imperialism as an outlet for blind passion masked 
by a profession of benevolence. We should be missionaries of civilization, and to 
bear the white man's burden, painful as it often is. (It should not be forgotten in 
this connection that James was an admirer of Rudyard Kipling.) In April, 1899. 
Roosevelt made his famous speech on "The Strenuous Life," which, fascinatingly. 
evoked a tong reply from James in which he accused Roosevelt and the whole im· 
perialistic group of "abstractness." 
James' active participation in the anti-imperialistic movement came to a close 
in his address before the Anti-lrnperiaJist League in Boston in the fall of 1903. He 
said, among other things, 
I think we have candidly to admit that in the matter of our Philip· 
pine conquest we ... have failed to produce much immediate effect.. .. 
'Duty and Destiny' have rolled over us like a Juggernaut.. .. 
Three years taler, despite his criticisms of Roosevelt, however, James surprisingly 
supported the election of Roosevelt to the presidency of Harvard. 
James' standard of international politic was always an application of his gos· 
pel of individualism. Tolerate differences and enjoy them. And to this he added his 
usual corollary that intolerance is intolerable. He was fond of saying that he "went 
in for small nations and small things generally. Damn great Empires! including that 
of the Absolute .... Give me individuals and their spheres of activity." 1t should be 
added, at the same time, that James' Americanism was never seriously shaken. In 
this instance, as in so many others, he remained instinctively loyal to his own, 
whether family, friend, institution or country. And his patriotism ran with two of 
his fundamental moral attitudes. He continually charged that Europe was relatively 
corrupt. America, so he contended, was less highly institutionalized, less subject to 
control by impersonal corporate entities than Europe. The other attitude, or senti· 
ment, which re-enforced James' patriotism was his repugnance to the decadent and 
the effete - his preference for the simple, the natural, the vigorous, and the forward­
looking. 
The last of the causes that enlisted James' support, as Perry says, was Mental 
Hygiene! But that is a story for which we have no space here. 
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I should like to conclude by mentioning the fact that James was never a class­
ifier or a supporter of rigid classifications, institutional or otherwise. I think it fair 
to say that, for him, morality is merely the active practical side of religion, in part 
I do believe that, although individual feelings initiate the religious life, we humans 
do need religious institutions, along with their rituaJs and rites and holy books. to 
give focus and solidjty to the religious life. But, like James, I rind my idea of a uni­
versal church beyond my hopes in this world. My sentiments are protestant and 
pluralistic in this domain as in others. Like James, again, any god or divine being 
worthy of worship must be finite, in order to cope with the problem of evil. Llke 
Peirce, I also believe that theology is a necessary adjunct of religious life. But l find 
none of the proofs for the existence of God, including Peirce's crewble. For my 
part, the business of theology is not to demonstrate the existence, or reality, of 
wvine being, but to de(end the right to believe. Too many o f  us renounce our reli­
gious faiths when we rtind that the existence of god cannot be proven. And for the 
last time, let me stress the heart bas reasons that the intellect knows not of. But 
Peirce himself believes this. Why then should he attempt to provide an argument of 
the existence of God? 
One la.st word. I ,am convinced that the tension between Peirce's philosophy 
of religion and that of James is a healthy one. The truth probably lies somewhere 
between them. As for John Dewey, my own opinion is that he is the weakest in his 
discussions or the varieties of religious experience. The religious life transcends the 
moral lit:e, just as it transcends the aesthetic lire. the scientific life, etc. God, if god 
there be, must be conceived as transcendent, which is not the same thing as trans­
cendental. And the reason for this is that religious experience itself transcends, or 
encompasses, all the other forms of experience of which human beings are capable. 
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